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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
John L. Flynn*

Driver's License Restricted to Use "To and
From School" Means Regular School Sessions
Only-Defendant, a sixteen year old high
school student, was convicted of a misdemeanor for driving at night from a school
basketball game to his home. A statute authorized the issuance of junior operator's licenses
to minors between sixteen and eighteen years
of age with the provision that such license
shall not entitle a licensee to operate a motor
vehicle after dark unless "going to and from
school". The court, in affirming, held that only
formal school sessions were intended, and concluded that the exception was designed to
allow driving from school in the wintertime
when darkness comes in the late afternoon.
People v. Harmes, 123 N.E. 2d 627 (N.Y. 1955).
The dissent contended that such an interpretation violated the principle that penal
statutes are to be strictly construed against the
state, and ignored the fact that extra-curricular activities are as much a part of the educational process as formal class instruction.
Lie-Detector Test Not a Matter of RightThe Supreme Court of Wisconsin has decided
that an accused has no right to take a liedetector test. An argument that a statute providing for analysis of evidence submitted to
the crime laboratory by defendants upon
approval of the court bestows such a right was
rejected. The court also indicated that liedetector evidence was not admissible "in any
event." State v. Perlin, 68 N.W. 2d 32 (Wis.
1955).
Use of Radar in Measuring Vehicle's Speed
Not a Speed Trap-Defendant was convicted
of speeding solely on the basis of radar evidence.
On appeal he contended that the use of the
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radar device constituted a speed trap-defined
by statute as "a particular section of a highway
measured as to distance and with boundaries
marked, designated or otherwise determined
in order that the speed of a vehicle may be calculated by securing the time it takes said vehicle to travel such known distance." The
court, in affirming the conviction, relied on the
fact that radar determines speed without reference to any particular section of the highway.
People v. Beamer, 279 P.2d 205 (Cal. 1955).
The dissent argued that the use of radar devices violates the spirit of the statute since the
legislature intended that officers should patrol
the highways.
Civil Service Employee Not Allowed to Enjoin Civil Service Commission in an Effort
to Prove -Alleged Defect in ExaminationAccording to a recent Illinois case, a person
who has unsuccessfully taken a civil service
examination has no right to a court injunction
in an effort to prove some alleged irregularity
or defect respecting the examination.
Plaintiffs, unsuccessful candidates in a civil
service examination, brought an action to
have the eligible register resulting from the
examination declared void and to enjoin the
Commissioner of the City of Chicago from
certifying anyone named on the register. The
court declared that a prayer for injunctive
relief must provide grounds upon which a
court can fix its equitable jurisdiction; the
acts complained of must not only be unauthorized and injurious, but injurious to civil,
personal or property rights as distinguished
from rights political in nature. The court
concluded that the acts of which plaintiff
complained were those of public officers and
as such were political in nature. Moreover,
positions under civil service were held to be in
the nature of public offices, political in charac-
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ter, in which the plaintiffs have no property
right. People ex rel Carterv. Hurley, 4 Ill. App.
2d 24 (1955).
Urine Specimen Obtained by Use of Catheter Over Oral Protest of Accused Held Inadmissible by Court of Military Appeals-Acting
upon the suspicion that the accused had been
using narcotics, military officials procured his
consent to provide them with a sample of body
fluid. When the accused was unable to urinate
an intravenous injection of glucose and water
was employed, without objection by the
accused, but again without success. A sample
was then obtained by catheterization, to which
process the accused orally objected. The United
States Court of Military Appeals reversed a
conviction based upon the evidence secured
through an analysis of the urine sample.
United States v. Jones, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 161 (1955).
The evidence was found to be inadmissible
on the basis that such an invasion of the body
constituted "a denial of military due process."
The majority opinion implicitly applied the
test formulated in Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952) (evidence obtained by means
of "conduct that shocks the conscience" held
inadmissible), finding that the use of the catheter was an invasion of "the sanctity of the human body". A concurring opinion distinguished
the holding in United States v. Williamson,
4 U.S.C.M.A. 320 (1954) (evidence obtained by
catheterization of unconscious accused held
admissible) on the ground that here the accused
had lodged an active protest. The decision in
United States v. Barnaby, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 63
(1955) (accused may be ordered by superior
officer to produce sample of body fluid) was
distinguished on the ground that in the present
case there had been no order issued but only
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a solicitation of the accused's permission, which
permission had been denied. Thus, the admissibility of the evidence was found to turn on the
method employed by the investigator to obtain it, the same point which controlled the
Rochin decision.
A strong dissent criticized the holding of the
court as an unwarranted extension of the rule
in the Rociin case, noting that the Supreme
Court of the United States has itself narrowly
limited that ruling by its decision in Imine v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1954) (due process
not violated absent coercion, violence, or
brutality to the person of the accused). Stating
that "[lilt is only when the Government seeks
to take advantage of the wrong of its agents
that it should be denied the right to use evidence ....
the dissent noted that no force,
violence, or physical coercion had been applied
to the person of the accused. Furthermore, the
doctor had the requisite authority to order
the accused to submit to the catheterization
but had no need to do so since the accused
submitted without resort to physical resistance.
Since this decision is apparently derived
from the "civilized standards" criteria of due
process evolved in the Rochin case, there
would seem to be serious doubts as to its validity. Here not only is the evidence upon which
the conviction was based reliable, but, in
addition, the methods used to obtain the evidence do not violate the principle that humane
standards should be employed by law enforcement officers in the administration of
criminal law. For an excellent article examining, among others, the humane standards
principle as one of the implications of the
Rochin decision see Allen, Due Process and
State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48
NW. U. L. REV. 16 (1953).

